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Abstract
In a recent paper “Neither Presentism nor Eternalism” (Foundations of Physics
(2019) 49, pp. 1325-1335) Carlo Rovelli argued that there is a way out of the
dilemma – presentism or eternalism. However his attempt to avoid it comes at
a high price: avoiding to address the fundamental question of the dimensional-
ity of the world and contradicting both Minkowski’s arguments for the reality of
spacetime, based on the experiments at his time, and the relativistic experimental
evidence after his time. I will summarize the main points of that contradiction
and will stress again that none of the experiments, which confirmed the relativistic
kinematic effects, would be possible if spacetime were not real, which demonstrates
that any claim (including Rovelli’s), that becoming is objective, directly contra-
dicts the experimental evidence.
Carlo Rovelli’s recent paper “Neither Presentism nor Eternalism” [1] can serve as
the beginning of a long overdue constructive discussion of the nature of spacetime.1
110 years after the publication of Minkowski’s world-view-changing paper “Space and
Time” [2] we owe such a meaningful and consensus-building discussion to the next
generations of not only physicists and philosophers.2 The reason is that the present
situation can hardly be described as satisfactory because of the proliferation of views,
not firmly based on the relativistic experimental evidence, which reject the reality of
spacetime either explicitly or implicitly by defending concepts (e.g., becoming and flow
of time) which are incompatible with the spacetime view of the world; at the same time
Minkowski’s own arguments for the reality of spacetime (based on the experimental
evidence at that time) have not been addressed let alone refuted.
I think Rovelli’s paper suffers of the same problem. Moreover, his attempt to avoid
the dilemma – presentism or eternalism – comes at a high price on five counts:
1. Rejecting “these two naive options” (presentism and eternalism) amounts
to avoiding to address the fundamental question of what the dimensionality of the
world (at the macroscopic scale) is. Presentism regards the physical world as three-
dimensional and evolving in time, whereas according to Minkowski’s (spacetime) view,
1As this paper examines the statements in Rovelli’s paper I have decided to use rather long foot-
notes, which allows me to support or clarify statements I make in the text while remaining focused
on Rovelli’s paper in the main text.
2One of the appropriate forums for such a discussion can be the biennial spacetime conferences:
http://www.minkowskiinstitute.org/conferences/
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also called block universe or eternalism (Rovelli uses the latter term), the physical
world is four-dimensional with time as the fourth dimension (as all moments of time
form the fourth dimension they must exist equally – as constituents of a dimension
they are given at once or en bloc like the points of the spatial dimensions). That is why,
saying “Neither Presentism nor Eternalism” (that is, “neither three-dimensionalism
nor four-dimensionalism”) means that the physical world is neither three-dimensional
nor four-dimensional. In other words, the title and the central claim of Rovelli’s paper
implicitly assume that the dimensionality of the world is not one of its most funda-
mental features (which is commonly regarded to be on equal footing with the very
existence of the world). If Rovelli really meant that, such a crucial claim should have
been explicitly made and arguments, based on the experimental evidence, against the
accepted view that dimensionality of the world is one of its most fundamental features
should have been provided. Moreover, explicitly asking the question of what the di-
mensionality of the world is avoids the confusion over the notions ‘exists’ and ‘real’
– in presentism these notions refer only to the present moment (exists now and real
now), whereas in the framework of the spacetime view (Minkowski’s view of reality as
an absolute four-dimensional world) the notions ‘exists’ and ‘real’ are absolute (with
no reference to moments of time for the obvious reason that time is not a separate
entity in spacetime).
2. Misrepresenting the spacetime view of the world3 [1, p. 1329]:
The difficulty with Eternalism (as the idea that past and future events are
“real now” as present events) is that it embraces a definition of “to be real
now” that clashes manifestly against our common use. It forces us to say
that past and future events are “real now”, which is nonsense: they are
not so, under any reasonable account of the use of “now”.
There are two inaccuracies in this representation of the spacetime view (eternal-
ism):
 It is a complete misrepresentation of the spacetime view to say that according
to it “past and future events are “real now” as present events” – none of its
supporters makes such an obviously self-contradictory statement. Neither the
spacetime view nor any of its supporters “embraces a definition of “to be real
now”.” The very phrase “to be real now” makes sense only in the presentist view.
As all events of spacetime have the same existential status no event is physically
privileged as “now” – that is why it is illegitimate to talk about “real now” in
spacetime. The existence of spacetime itself and existence in spacetime (e.g., of
particles’ worldlines) do not refer to any specific event – it is this “static” notion
of existence that was employed by Minkowski when he introduced4 the spacetime
view of the world (that reality is an absolute four-dimensional world; Minkowski
3It is puzzling why here Rovelli misrepresented the spacetime view (eternalism), whereas on p.
1325 he presented it correctly: “the idea that present, past and future events are “equally real”.” My
only guess is that it is easy to criticise the self-contradictory definition given in the quote.
4Poincare´ first published [5] his observation that the Lorentz transformations can be viewed as rota-
tions in a four-dimensional space with time as the fourth dimension but he regarded it as a mathemat-
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called it die Welt, the World): “The whole world presents itself as resolved into
such worldlines” and this (four-dimensional) world and the particles’ worldlines
simply exist5 in the sense used by Minkowski and employed in the spacetime
view of the world by prominent relativists starting with Einstein (“It appears
therefore more natural to think of physical reality as a four-dimensional exis-
tence, instead of, as hitherto, the evolution of a three-dimensional existence”),
Eddington (“Events do not happen; they are just there”), Weyl (“The objec-
tive world merely exists, it does not happen”), Geroch (“there is no dynamics
in space-time: nothing ever happens there. Space-time is an unchanging, once-
and-for-all picture encompassing past, present, and future”).
 It is incorrect to talk about past and future events in spacetime since all events
of spacetime are equally real and are not physically (objectively) divided into
past, present and future.6
3. Effectively misinterpreting the physical meaning of Einstein’s equations [1, pp.
1328-29]:
ical construction which does not represent anything in the physical world (Poincare´’s conventionalism
led him to regard spacetime as a mathematical convention, which would be even disadvantageous:
“the language of three dimensions seems the best suited to the description of our world” [6]; for more
details see [7]). It was Minkowski who first realized that reality is an absolute four-dimensional world
with time as the fourth dimension by successfully decoding the profound physical message hidden in
the failed experiments (including the Michelson-Morley experiment) to detect absolute motion (see [4]
and the summary of Minkowski’s arguments for the reality of spacetime below). The recollections of
Minkowski’s student Max Born also confirm that Minkowski arrived independently at what Einstein
called special relativity and at the notion of spacetime, but Einstein [8] and Poincare´ [5] published first
(for more details see: http://www.minkowskiinstitute.org/born.html). Minkowski did not publish his
results earlier since he was developing the four-dimensional formalism of spacetime physics (which we
now use) reported in 1907 and published in 1908 as a 59-page treatise. Max Born wrote [9]: “He
told me later that it came to him as a great shock when Einstein published his paper in which the
equivalence of the different local times of observers moving relative to each other were pronounced;
for he had reached the same conclusions independently but did not publish them because he wished
first to work out the mathematical structure in all its splendour. He never made a priority claim and
always gave Einstein his full share in the great discovery.” More importantly, Born recalled that at
the seminar organized by Minkowski and Hilbert in the early summer of 1905 “Minkowski occasionally
alluded to the fact that he was engaged with the Lorentz transformations, and that he was on the track
of new interrelationships” [10]. At the time of the seminar, neither Einstein’s paper [8] nor Poincare´’s
paper [5] were published! Annalen der Physik received Einstein’s paper “On the Electrodynamics of
Moving Bodies” on June 30, 1905; Rendiconti del Circolo matematico di Palermo received Poincare´’s
paper “On the Dynamics of the Electron” (in which Poincare´ regarded the Lorentz transformations
as rotations in a four-dimensional space with time as the fourth dimension) on July 23, 1905.
5One can easily get rid of the temptation to declare that Minkowski’s World (spacetime) is nothing
more than a four-dimensional mathematical manifold by examining Minkowski’s arguments (summa-
rized below) of why the experimental evidence at his time unambiguously demonstrated that reality
is a four-dimensional world modeled by his die Welt (spacetime).
6In the context of relativistic causality, we do talk about past and future events (lying in the past
and the future light cones at a given event, respectively), but this has nothing to do with their reality;
moreover, events that are past and future for a given event (serving as the apex of a light cone at that
event) can be neither past nor future for another event (the apex of another light cone separated by
some spacelike interval from the apex of the first light cone), which is a separate proof that spacetime
events are not physically (objectively) divided into past, present and future.
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The Einstein’s equations are evolution equations, like any other equations
of physics. There is no reason for not taking them as describing the un-
folding of events, coherently with our experience.
I wonder how many relativists would agree with this interpretation of Einstein’s equa-
tions. The accepted interpretation of general relativity (that directly follows from
its mathematical formalism and the experimental fact,7 which confirmed the geodesic
principle, that falling bodies do not resist their downward acceleration) is that Ein-
stein’s equations determine the spacetime geometry induced by the distribution of
matter in spacetime (what is described by the stress-energy tensor on the right-hand
side of Einstein’s equations).8
Once the spacetime geometry is determined, it, in turn, determines the geodesic
worldlines which represent the entire history / evolution in time of particles moving by
inertia (i.e., non-resistantly). This is in the case of curved spacetimes when Einstein’s
equations determine what spacetime geometry corresponds to a given distribution of
matter in the Universe. However, in both special and general relativity (i.e., in both
flat and curved spacetime) “the unfolding of events” is represented by a forever given
web of worldlines in spacetime, that is, it is realized “at once” (given en bloc) in
spacetime9 – (to repeat Minkowski’s famous expression) “The whole world presents
itself as resolved into such worldlines.”
This is the reason for “not taking them [Einstein’s equations] as describing the
unfolding of events, coherently with our experience.” Here is a specific example – the
unfolding of events involving a free particle (i.e., its evolution in time) is represented by
a timelike geodesic worldline in spacetime (the particle’s history in time); there does
not exist even a hint in general (or special) relativity that the events comprising the
particle’s worldline are becoming real (coming into existence), one after the other10 –
the events of the particle’s worldline (like all events comprising spacetime) are equally
real ; otherwise, if they were not given “at once,” no worldline would exist. Again, a
7This is the experimental fact, which demonstrated that there is no gravitational force in Nature:
falling particles do not resist their fall, which proves that no gravitational force is acting on the
particles. A gravitational force would be required to accelerate them downwards if and only if the
particles resisted their acceleration, because only then a gravitational force would be needed to overcome
that resistance. Moreover, general relativity demonstrated that the downward acceleration of a falling
particle is not a true acceleration (represented by a curvature, or rather deformation, of the particle’s
worldline) since its true (curved-spacetime) acceleration aµ = d2xµ/dτ2 + Γµαβ(dx
α/dτ)(dxβ/dτ) is
zero, which demonstrates that the falling particle does move by inertia (non-resistantly); the apparent
downward acceleration of the falling particle is caused by geodesic deviation, which is a manifestation
of the fact that the particle’s worldline and the Earth’s worldtube converge because there are no
parallel worldlines in the non-Euclidean spacetime region in the vicinity of the Earth’s worldtube.
8I think the only way to challenge the accepted natural interpretation of general relativity is to
question the experimental fact (!), mentioned above, and to argue that both spacetime and worldlines
do not represent anything in the physical world and are only mathematical abstractions.
9Perhaps the visualization that works the best in a class on relativity is the film strip of an old
movie – what we watch on the screen appears to be a real unfolding of events, but we know that that
unfolding of events is realized “at once” on the film strip.
10As proper time is length along a timelike worldline (whose events exist equally and are not coming
into existence one by one), it is evident that objective becoming or real flow of time cannot be associated
with proper time (length does not flow!).
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brute-force objection – worldlines do not represent anything in the physical world –
must obviously refute Minkowski’s arguments for the reality of spacetime (a web of
such worldlines) and specifically his argument for the reality of the worldline (rather
worldtube) of a body undergoing relativistic contraction of its length (Minkowski’s
explanation of length contraction, which is the accepted explanation).
4. Ignoring and contradicting Minkowski’s arguments for the reality of spacetime
by stating that “There is nothing in relativity which is in contradiction with our
experience of time, or that suggests that our experience is “illusory” [1, p. 1326].”
Again, I wonder how many physicists (and philosophers of physics) would agree with
this statement.11 In his famous lecture “Space and Time” delivered on September 21,
1908 (and published in 1909) Minkowski showed that the situation is just the opposite
– all experiments which failed to detect absolute motion revealed that what Einstein
called special theory is, in fact, a theory of an absolute four-dimensional world (flat
spacetime), which is drastically different from our perception of time because all events
of this world are real, which means that there is no becoming and no time flow in it;
that is why Minkowski began his lecture by announcing the radical changes in our
understanding of space and time [2, p. 57]:
The views of space and time which I want to present to you arose from
the domain of experimental physics, and therein lies their strength. Their
tendency is radical. From now onwards space by itself and time by itself
shall completely fade into mere shadows and only a specific union of the
two will still stand independently on its own.
Recognizing this challenging new world view (whose tendency is indeed radical),
the first attempts12 to reconcile the spacetime view (all events of spacetime are real)
and our perception of time (we are aware of ourselves and of the external world only
at a single and constantly changing moment – the moment ‘now’) were made by
Eddington [12]:
Events do not happen; they are just there, and we come across them.
and Weyl [13]:
The objective world merely exists, it does not happen; as a whole it has no
history. Only before the eye of the consciousness climbing up in the world
line of my body, a section of this world “comes to life” and moves past it
as a spatial image engaged in temporal transformation.
11I guess many might point out that not only relativity “is in contradiction with our experience
of time” but even classical physics contradicts our perception of time because we believe only the
moment ‘now’ is real, whereas there is nothing in the classical physical theories which shows that one
moment of time is physically privileged as the moment ‘now.’
12I am unaware of any other efforts to overcome or at least to address adequately that disturbing
contradiction.
5
I guess if Minkowski were alive he would probably point out that real becoming
(unfolding of events) in spacetime amounts to a contradiction in terms. I think the
only way to avoid such a contradiction is to declare explicitly that spacetime does not
represent anything in the physical world and is nothing more than a mathematical
space. But such a declaration should come after refuting Minkowski’s arguments for
the reality of spacetime. In his 1908 lecture Minkowski gave two arguments – a general
and a specific argument. Here is a summary of his arguments and I think any explicit
or implicit rejection of the reality of spacetime should obvious come after refuting
them.
Minkowski’s main argument that the world is four-dimensional
It should be stressed that Minkowski deduced this argument from the experiments
that failed to detect absolute motion (from Galileo’s experiments to the Michelson-
Morley experiment). He himself emphasized it in the beginning of his lecture (quoted
above) when he announced the revolutionary view of space and time pointing out that
he deduced it from those experiments : “The views of space and time which I want to
present to you arose from the domain of experimental physics, and therein lies their
strength.”
Here is Minkowski’s most general argument that the world is four-dimensional.
To explain the experiment of Michelson-Morley, which failed to detect the Earth’s
absolute motion, Lorentz suggested that observers on Earth can formally use a time
that is different from the true time of an observer at absolute rest. Einstein postulated
that the times of different observers in relative motion are equally good, that is, each
observer has his own time, and that for Einstein meant that time is relative.
As a mathematician Minkowski probably immediately realized that as observers
in relative motion have different equally real times, they inescapably have different
spaces13 as well, because space is defined as a set of simultaneous events and different
times imply different simultaneity, i.e., different spaces (or simply – different times
imply different spaces because space is perpendicular to time) [2, p. 62]:
“Hereafter we would then have in the world no more the space, but an
infinite number of spaces analogously as there is an infinite number of
planes in three-dimensional space. Three-dimensional geometry becomes
a chapter in four-dimensional physics. You see why I said at the beginning
13Minkowski specifically pointed out that “Neither Einstein nor Lorentz disputed the concept of
space” [2, p. 65] and provided an additional insight from his analysis of the mathematical formalism
of classical mechanics (in his efforts to reveal the physical meaning of the failed experiments to
detect absolute motion) that led him to the concept of an absolute four-dimensional world – die
Welt (spacetime): “To go beyond the concept of space in such a way is an instance of what can only
be imputed to the audacity of mathematical culture. After this further step, which is indispensable for
the true understanding of the group Gc, I think the word relativity postulate used for the requirement
of invariance under the group Gc is very feeble. Since the meaning of the postulate is that through
the phenomena only the four-dimensional world in space and time is given, but the projection in space
and in time can still be made with certain freedom, I want to give this affirmation rather the name
the postulate of the absolute world (or shortly the world postulate).”
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that space and time will recede completely to become mere shadows and
only a world in itself will exist.”
Therefore the failure of all experiments to detect absolute motion (encapsulated in
the principle of relativity – physical phenomena look the same in all inertial reference
frames14) has indeed a profound physical meaning – all those experiments failed to
detect absolute motion (i.e., uniform motion in the absolute space) because there exists
not a single (and therefore absolute) space, but many spaces (and many times) in the
world; physical phenomena look the same for all observers in relative motion, because
each observer performs experiments in his own space and uses his own time (e.g.,
the speed of light is the same for all observers in relative motion since each observer
measures it in his own space by using his own time).
Now Minkowski’s argument, deduced from the experimental evidence, that the
world is four-dimensional, becomes evident: the world must be four-dimensional in
order that observers in relative motion have different spaces (and times).
Minkowski did not stress that the experimental results (that gave rise to the prin-
ciple of relativity) would be impossible (i.e., the failure to detect absolute motion
by experiments would no longer be observed and absolute motion would become de-
tectable), if the world were three-dimensional (which would mean that there would
exist a single and therefore absolute three-dimensional space and a single and therefore
absolute time) most probably because he regarded it as self-evident. And, indeed, if
the physical world were three-dimensional, there would exist a single (and therefore
absolute) space, i.e. a single class of simultaneous events (a single time), which would
mean that simultaneity and time would be absolute in contradiction with both the the-
ory of relativity and, most importantly, with the experiments which failed to detect
absolute motion.
I hope it is now clear why explicitly addressing the issue of the dimensionality of the
world (at the macroscopic scale) is crucial in the debate over the nature of spacetime
– I believe it is seen that Minkowski’s general argument is sufficient to prove that the
world is four-dimensional.15
Minkowski’s specific argument
Minkowski’s concrete argument for the reality of worldlines (or rather worldtubes
in the case of spatially extended bodies), and therefore for the four-dimensionality of
the world, is given in his explanation of the deep physical meaning of length contraction
depicted in the right-hand part of Fig. 1 of his paper “Space and Time” and reproduced
here as Fig. 1.
The essence of his explanation (which is the accepted correct explanation) is that
the relativistic length contraction of a body is a manifestation of the reality of the
body’s worldtube. Minkowski considered two bodies in uniform relative motion rep-
resented by their worldtubes as shown in Fig. 1. To understand why the worldtube
14If they did not look the same, absolute motion would be detected.
15Because experimental results (the experimental failure to detect absolute motion) would be im-
possible if the world were not four-dimensional – uniform motion with respect to the single (absolute)
space of a three-dimensional world would be detected by experiment.
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Fig. 1
It consists of two sheets separated by t = 0 by analogy with a two-sheeted
hyperboloid. We consider the sheet in the region t > 0 and we will now
take those homogeneous linear transformations of x, y, z, t in four new vari-
ables x0, y0, z0, t0 so that the expression of this sheet in the new variables has
the same form. Obviously, the rotations of space about the origin belong
to these transformations. A full understanding of the rest of those trans-
formations can be obtained by considering such among them for which y
and z remain unchanged. We draw (Fig. 1) the intersection of that sheet
with the plane of the x- and the t-axis, i.e. the upper branch of the hyper-
bola c2t2   x2 = 1 with its asymptotes. Further we draw from the origin
O an arbitrary radius vector OA0 of this branch of the hyperbola; then we
add the tangent to the hyperbola at A0 to intersects the right asymptote at
B0; from OA0B0 we complete the parallelogram OA0B0C 0; finally, as we will
need it later, we extend B0C 0 so that it intersects the x-axis at D0. If we
now regard OC 0 and OA0 as axes for new coordinates x0, t0, with the scale
units OC 0 = 1, OA0 = 1/c, then that branch of the hyperbola again obtains
the expression ct02   x02 = 1, t0 > 0, and the transition from x, y, z, t to
x0, y0, z0, t0 is one of the transformations in question. These transformations
plus the arbitrary displacements of the origin of space and time constitute a
group of transformations which still depends on the parameter c and which
I will call Gc.
If we now increase c to infinity, so 1/c converges to zero, it is clear from
the figure that the branch of the hyperbola leans more and more towards the
x-axis, that the angle between the asymptotes becomes greater, and in the
limit that special transformation converts to one where the t0-axis may be
in any upward direction and x0 approaches x ever more closely. By taking
Figure 1: The right-hand part of Fig. 1 in Minkowski’s paper “Space and Time”
of a body must be real in order that length contraction be possible, consider the body
represented by the vertical worldtube. The three-dimensional cross-section PP , re-
sulting from the intersection of the body’s worldtube and the space (represented by
the horizontal line in Fig. 1) of an observer at rest with respect to the body, is the
body’s proper length. The three-dimensional cross-section P ′P ′, resulting from the in-
tersection of the body’s worldtube and the space (represented by the inclined dashed
line) of an observer at rest with respect to the second body (represented by the in-
clined worldtube), is the relativistically contracted length of the body measured by
that observer (the cros -section P ′P ′ only appears longer than PP because a fact of
the pseudo-Euclidean geometry of spacetime is represented on the Euclidean surface
of the page). Note that while measuring the same body, the two observers measure
two three-dimensional bodies represented by the cross-sections PP and P ′P ′ in Fig. 1
(thi situati n i not paradoxical because what is m ant by “the same body” is the
body’s worldtube).
In order to feel the strength of the argument that length contraction is impossible in
a three-dimensional world, assume that reality were indeed a three-dimensional world,
which would mean that the worldtube of the body did not exist as a four-dimensional
object and were nothing more than an abstract geometrical construction. Then, what
would exist would be a single three-dimensional body, represented by the proper cross-
section PP , and both observers would measure the same three-dimensional body of
the same length. Therefore, not only would length contraction be impossible, but
relativity of simultaneity would be also impossible since a spatially extended three-
dimensional object is defined in terms of simultaneity – all parts of a body taken
simultaneously at a given moment – and as both observers in relative motion would
measure the same three-dimensional body (represented by the cross-section PP ) they
would share the same class of simultaneous events in contradiction with relativity.
So, Minkowski’s specific argument for the reality of spacetime is: the worldtube
of a body undergoing length contraction must be real in order that relativistic length
contraction be possible.16 Again, Minkowski did not state it this way probably because
16One may object that Minkowski’s argument is irrefutable only if existence is regarded as abso-
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it looked obvious to him or maybe he did not anticipate that the spacetime structure
of the world, which he discovered, would meet such a resistance.
5. Ignoring and contradicting the relativistic experimental evidence after
Minkowski’s time. It should be particularly emphasized that all experiments, which
confirmed the relativistic kinematic effects,17 would be impossible, if the world were
three-dimensional, because there would exist a single (absolute) time, a single (abso-
lute) space and therefore a single (absolute) class of simultaneous events which means
that the experiments that confirmed the relativistic effects of time dilation and length
contraction18 would be impossible because these effects are specific manifestations of
relativity of simultaneity (for details see [4], [15], [17]). Therefore, when the issue
of the dimensionality of the world is explicitly addressed, it becomes clear that the
experiments, which proved the relativistic kinematic effects, unambiguously demon-
strate that spacetime is real, i.e., that all spacetime events have equal existence. That
is why, Rovelli’s claim that there exists objective becoming (i.e., that spacetime is not
real) directly contradicts the experimental evidence.
Here it is worth mentioning that Minkowski’s general argument for the reality of
spacetime (to stress it again, deduced from the experimental evidence) – not only do
observers in relative motion have different times, but they have different spaces, which
is impossible in a three-dimensional world – revealed the physical meaning not only of
relativity of simultaneity19 (it is impossible in a three-dimensional world; reality is an
absolute four-dimensional world and observers in relative motion can choose20 from the
equally existing spacetime events different three-dimensional spacelike hypersurfaces as
their spaces, i.e., as their classes of simultaneous events), but also of conventionality of
simultaneity. It turned out that both relativity of simultaneity and conventionality of
simultaneity have the same physical meaning – reality is an absolute four-dimensional
world which makes it possible, when we describe it in the ordinary three-dimensional
lute. If existence is relativized (regarded as frame-dependent) then length contraction and the other
relativistic effects would be explained in the framework of a relativized presentist view. I wonder how
many physicists and philosophers would adopt such a view, especially if it is examined closely; not
only would such an examination reveal unsurmountable problems [15], but would also demonstrate
that a relativized presentism contradicts the relativistic experimental evidence (the twin paradox)
[15].
17For example, it is an experimental fact, used every fraction of a second by the GPS, that observers
in relative motion have different times, which is impossible in a three-dimensional world, where there
are a single space and a single time.
18Along with time dilation, the muon experiment effectively tested length contraction experimentally
as well: “In the muon’s reference frame, we reconcile the theoretical and experimental results by use
of the length contraction effect, and the experiment serves as a verification of this effect” [16].
19On the spacetime view, accepted in physics (because it is firmly supported by the relativistic
experimental evidence), simultaneity is relative and any claim that simultaneity can be absolute (by
questioning that or redefining the notion of simultaneity [18]) must obviously either demonstrate
that that claim is compatible with the spacetime view (all spacetime events are real) or refute the
arguments for the reality of spacetime.
20This is the key point – the absolute four-dimensional world must exist in order that observers in
relative motion have from where to choose different three-dimensional spacelike hypersurfaces; that
is why relativity of simultaneity is impossible in a three-dimensional world – it “contains” a single
(therefore absolute) space, i.e., a single (therefore absolute) class of simultaneous events.
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language, to have from where to choose freely (by convention) any (spacelike) three-
dimensional hypersurface as our space, i.e., as our class of simultaneous events [19].
That is why relativity of simultaneity implies conventionality of simultaneity and vice
versa [20]. Any claim that simultaneity is relative but not conventional is another
manifestation of the contradiction in terms mentioned above: there is no objectively
privileged (the only one that exists) class of simultaneous events (due to relativity of
simultaneity), but there is an objectively privileged (the only one that exists) class of
simultaneous events (due to the non-conventionality of simultaneity).
Therefore, conventionality of simultaneity is also an argument for the reality of
spacetime21 because it is “contained” in Minkowski’s general argument.
To summarize: taking into account even only Minkowski’s own arguments for
the reality of spacetime22 demonstrates that “The “third option” between Presentism
and Eternalism” [1, p. 1334] – “The “present” is not illusory: it is well defined,
but relative to a location” – proposed by Rovelli contradicts Minkowski’s arguments
because Rovelli explicitly states that, not the whole spacetime, but only the “local
becomings” are real [1, p. 1334]:23
The four-dimensional spacetime is only a cartography of the relations be-
tween these multiple local becomings.
I believe it is now obvious that questioning the reality of spacetime should come
after Minkowski’s arguments are addressed and refuted. I do not see any other scientific
option.
21In a recent paper Thyssen [21] made two objections:
 Stating that“the transitivity objection still applies” (“transitivity of the relation ‘is real for”’)
to such an argument; that may be true for Weingard’s original argument [22], but not for
Minkowski’s general argument (which explained the physical meaning of both conventionality
of simultaneity and relativity of simultaneity), because there is no “relation ‘is real for”’ in
Minkowski’s (spacetime) view – in the absolute four-dimensional world existence is absolute.
That conventionality of simultaneity (along with relativity of simultaneity) is an argument for
the reality of spacetime is immediately seen by that fact that conventionality of simultaneity
is impossible in a three-dimensional world which has a single class of simultaneous events.
So reality must be a four-dimensional world (where an observer has the freedom to choose
different spacelike hypersurfaces as his class of simultaneous events). That is why the issue of
the dimensionality of the world is crucial for revealing the nature of spacetime.
 Insisting that special relativity “leaves the debate on the dimensionality of the world under-
determined.” I completely disagree – here I have done my best to summarize Minkowski’s
arguments (not mentioned in Thyssen’s paper) for the reality of spacetime (and the experi-
ments that were performed after Minkowski) and to demonstrate that experiments would be
impossible if reality were not an absolute four-dimensional world.
22The arguments demonstrating that the experiments, which confirmed the relativistic kinematic
effects, would be impossible, if spacetime did not exist powerfully reinforce Minkowski’s arguments.
23This statement is not sufficiently elaborated in Rovelli’s paper but it seems it implies relativized
existence, which, as pointed out above, ultimately also contradicts the experimental evidence.
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